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Abstract
We investigated the spontaneous brain electric activity of 13 skeptics and 16 believers in 
paranormal phenomena; they were university students assessed with a self-report scale about 
paranormal beliefs. 33-channel EEG recordings during no-task resting were processed as 
sequences of momentary potential distribution maps. Based on the maps at peak times of 
Global Field Power, the sequences were parsed into segments of quasi-stable
potential distribution, the ‘microstates’. The microstates were clustered into four classes of 
map topographies (A–D). Analysis of the microstate parameters time coverage, occurrence 
frequency and duration as well as the temporal sequence (syntax) of the microstate classes 
revealed significant differences: Believers had a higher coverage and occurrence of class B, 
tended to decreased coverage and occurrence of class C, and showed a predominant sequence 
of microstate concatenations from A to C to B to A that was reversed in skeptics (A to B to C 
to A). Microstates of different topographies, putative ‘‘atoms of thought’’, are
hypothesized to represent different types of information processing.The study demonstrates 
that personality differences can be detected in resting EEG microstate parameters and 
microstate syntax. Microstate analysis yielded no conclusive evidence for the hypothesized 
relation between paranormal belief and schizophrenia.
Keywords:        
microstate syntax; cognition; paranormal beliefs; schizotypy; transition probabilities, 
schizophrenia
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Introduction
The functional state of the brain changes continually, even if there are no stimuli or tasks. The 
brain’s processing of a given, external or internal information depends on the momentary 
functional state. Brain state can be monitored by electroencephalography (EEG) at the split-
second speed needed for successful interaction with the surround.
Multichannel EEG displayed as sequence of momentary potential topographies (maps) 
shows quasi-stable configurations (mean duration of about 100 ms for spontaneous EEG) 
called functional microstates (Lehmann et al. 1987) that are concatenated by rapid transitions. 
Different microstates have been attributed to different types of cognitive processes (Britz et al. 
2009; Lehmann et al. 1998, 2010; Mohr et al. 2005; Mu¨ller et al. 2005) qualifying them for 
‘‘atoms of thought’’ (Lehmann et al. 2010). Microstate topographies during no-task resting 
can be clustered into four map configurations that explain[80% of the total data variance 
(Koenig et al. 2002). These four classes have been observed in independent studies with 
notable similarity across subjects (Koenig et al. 1999; Lehmann et al. 2005). Microstate 
parameters (duration, frequency of occurrence) of the four classes differ between 
schizophrenics and controls (Irisawa et al. 2006; Kikuchi et al. 2007; Koenig et al. 1999; 
Lehmann et al. 2005). The temporal concatenation of microstates (‘syntax’) showed non-
random behavior in healthy participants (Wackermann et al. 1993). Also, microstate syntax 
exhibited a particular, deviant pattern in untreated schizophrenics compared to controls 
(Lehmann et al. 2005). Thus, the syntax of microstates may reflect personal cognitive 
strategies. 
The EEG microstate concept was supported by fMRI studies where the time courses of 
microstates when convoluted with the hemodynamic response allowed to predict the BOLD 
signatures of resting-state networks (‘RSNs’) (Britz et al. 2010; Musso et al. 2010) which 
display slower spontaneous fluctuations (about 10 s for no-task conditions) of the coherences 
of the BOLD response (Mantini et al. 2007); microstates were thus suggested to represent the 
underlying electrophysiological basis of RSNs. This is due to the monofractal, scale-free 
dynamics of microstate sequences, i.e., the information contained in the temporal dynamics of 
microstates is preserved over large timescales (Van De Ville et al. 2010).
Inspired by the universality of EEG microstates, we wondered whether personality 
features of healthy people were also reflected in the parameters and syntax of microstates.
Using a previously obtained dataset (Pizzagalli et al. 2000), we examined microstates 
during spontaneous awake no-task resting EEG of participants
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Materials and Methods
352 university students answered a questionnaire (4-point scale) about belief in and 
experience of paranormal phenomena (Mischo et al. 1993). 117 agreed to participate in a 
subsequent EEG recording. Because 91 of the volunteers were women, men were excluded 
from the further assessment to avoid gender as a confounding factor. The questionnaire 
consists of 6 items, concerning mainly telepathy and precognition, and results in a score from 
0 (strong skepticism) to 18 (strong belief in paranormal phenomena). Volunteers in the upper 
and lower 33% of the paranormal belief scale were accepted if right-handed, and native 
German speakers without personal or family history of psychiatric disorders. 19 ‘believers’ 
and 18 ‘skeptics’ remained for recordings. Eight persons with <10 s artifact free EEG had to 
be excluded, leaving 16 believers (score range 15–18) and 13 skeptics (score range 0–6) for 
analysis. The two groups of participants did not differ in age, handedness and education level.
The study protocol was approved by the local Ethics Committee. Participants gave their 
written consent and were financially compensated.
Thirty-five EEG electrodes with reference at Cz were attached according to the 10–10 
system (Chatrian et al. 1988). Electrodes at the outer left and right canthus and infraorbital  
monitored eye movements. Participants were comfortably seated in a sound- and light-
shielded recording chamber. They were told that the recording will be done during no-task 
resting with closed or open eyes, requested via intercom, consisting of 20 s eyes open; 40 s 
eyes closed; 20 s eyes open; 40 s eyes closed. EEG was continuously recorded with 0.05–
60 Hz band pass, digitized at 250 samples/ s/ channel. Only eyes closed recordings were 
used for analysis.
Eye movement artifacts were removed using ICA (BrainVision Analyzer 2.0, Brain 
Products, Munich, Germany), followed by manual screening for other artifacts. Channels 
O9 and O10 were removed because of frequent muscle artifacts in most participants,  
leaving 33 channels. Data were segmented into artifact-free 2 s epochs and digitally band 
passed 2-20 Hz. Across participants, on average there was 27.7±8.0 s (25.9±8.4 s) for 
believers (skeptics) 33channel artifact-free eyes-closed EEG.
For microstate analysis (Koenig et al. 2002; Lehmann et al. 1987, 2005), all 
momentary (potential distribution) maps at peak times of global field power (GFP) 
(Lehmann and Skrandies 1980) after normalization to GFP = 1 were clustered into four 
map topographies using k-means clustering (Pascual-Marqui et al. 1995). Across 
participants, the topographies of the four microstate classes explained 84.0 ± 5.1% of the 
total variance. The four map topographies of each participant were labeled according to the 
best fit microstate topography of classes A, B, C, D in a normative study (Koenig et al.  
2002). The four labeled individual microstate maps of each participant were used to
label the sequential momentary maps at peak times of GFP, resulting in time sequences 
of the four microstate classes. 
An average map was computed for each microstate class for each participant. 
Separately for the two participant groups, an average map for each of the four microstate 
classes was computed across participants. The microstate map topographies were tested for 
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global differences of the spatial potential distributions between groups using TANOVA 
(Strik et al. 1998). The program calculates Global Map Dissimilarity (Lehmann and 
Skrandies 1980) as measure of the global difference between two map topographies and 
establishes the exact probability of the observed difference using a randomization 
procedure. Channel-wise t-tests specified the spatial distributions of the differences.
The three microstate parameters of mean duration, frequency of occurrence per second, 
and percentage of occupied total analysis time (‘coverage’) were computed for each of the 
four microstate classes of each participant. 
In addition, the frequency of GFP peaks per second was established for each microstate 
class and all participants. Since microstate parameters were calculated for each 2 s epoch 
separately, the duration of the microstate at the beginning and the end of an epoch were 
truncated, on average by 50%. We corrected the microstate mean durations by applying Eq. 
1 (provided by Thomas Koenig) to the durations of each microstate class of each 
participant: 
where durationcorrected is the corrected mean duration of the microstates of class X, 
durationobserved is the computed mean duration of the microstates of class X, occurrence is 
the number of occurrences of microstates of class X observed during the analyzed time 
epoch, and coverage is the fraction of time of the analyzed epoch covered by the 
microstates of class X.
The three microstate parameters were assessed using ANOVAs with group (believers, 
skeptics) as between subject factor and microstate class (A, B, C, D) as within subject  
factor.
The concatenation of the microstate classes over time (‘microstate syntax’) was 
examined as follows: The number of transitions from each of the four microstate classes to  
any other class (12 possibilities given the two directions of the six possible pairings of  
microstates), normalized by the total amount of microstate class transitions (X  Y for 
X ≠ Y) was obtained for each participant. In this way, the 12 possible microstate transitions 
were assessed as microstate transition percentages. To examine directional asymmetries in  
the transitions (‘directional predominance’) between the six possible microstate pairs,  
directional predominance XY was calculated as difference of the two transition 
percentages between two given microstate classes [(X  Y)-(Y  X)].
To assess the transition probabilities, ANOVAs were computed with group as between-
subject factor and microstate pairing (six possibilities) as within-subject factor.
In case of statistically interesting results, correlations with the paranormal belief score 
were computed.
6 of 17
Results 
Figure 1a shows the four averaged microstate map topographies for believers and for skeptics. 
The topographies o the obtained classes A, B, C and D resemble the topographies of previous 
studies (Koenig et al. 1999, 2002). The spatial distributions of the corresponding standard 
errors are displayed in Fig. 1b (note that isopotential lines are in steps of 1.0 units in Fig. 1a, 
of 0.1 units in Fig. 1b).
--- Fig. 1 about here ---
Figure 1c displays the t-values of the channel-wise t-tests between the map topographies of 
the two groups TANOVA showed that the map topographies differed significantly between 
groups for microstate A (P < 0.001) B (P = 0.003), and C (P = 0.002) but not for microstate D. 
TANOVA showed that within both groups, all four microstate map topographies differed 
significantly from each other (P-values between P < 0.01 and P < 0.00001). Viewed as 
channel-wise t-value topographies, in microstates class A, believers showed higher values 
right posterior (t(max) = 4.32), skeptics left lateral (t(max) = -4.22). For class B, believers had 
higher values right anterior (t(max) = 3.73), skeptics left posterior (t(max) = -3.44). For class 
C, believers had higher values in the periphery (t(max) = 3.74), skeptics in central areas 
(t(max) = -3.81). For class D, believers had higher values central right (t(max) = 1.51), 
skeptics in central-posterior left (t(max) = -2.03).
For the three microstate parameters duration, occurrence and coverage, a 2-factor 
ANOVA (group 9 microstate) revealed no main effect of group but significant group by 
microstate interactions for occurrence [F(3, 81) = 4.27; P = 0.007] and coverage [F(3.81) = 
2.91; P = 0.039]. Post-hoc comparisons (Table 1) revealed that microstate class B showed 
significant increases of occurrence and coverage in believers compared to skeptics (P = 0.044 
and P = 0.023, respectively), and revealed that microstate class C showed a tendency to 
decreases of occurrence and coverage in believers (P = 0.093 and P = 0.064, respectively). 
For class B, paranormal belief score correlated with coverage (r = 0.43, N = 29, P = 
0.019) and showed a tendency to correlate with occurrence (r = 0.36, N = 29, P = 0.053) but 
showed no correlation with duration. For class C, paranormal belief score showed tendencies 
to correlate negative with coverage and occurrence (r = -0.34, N = 29, P = 0.070 and r = -0.35, 
N = 29, P = 0.066, respectively).
The mean frequency of GFP peaks per second across all participants decreased from 
microstate class A (21.44 ± 0.21 SE) to B (21.17 ± 0.22 SE) to C (20.89 ± 0.22 SE) to D 
(20.80 ± 0.21 SE). GFP peaks frequency of class A differed from that of classes B, C and D at 
P = 0.07,
P = 0.0002, and P = 0.000001, respectively; that of class B differed from C and D at 
P = 0.06 and P = 0.01, respectively, while GFP peaks frequency did not differ significantly 
between classes C and D. The results were similar in believers and skeptics when separately 
examined.
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--- Table 1 about here ---
For the directional predominances within the microstate syntax, a 2-factor ANOVA 
(group 9 microstate pair) revealed a significant interaction of group by microstate pair 
[F(5.135) = 3.31; P = 0.007]. Post-hoc analysis showed that believers differed significantly in 
their directional predominances for the microstate pairs A↔B, A↔C and B↔C (Table 2; Fig. 
2).
This result is accounted for by the reversed directions of directional predominance for 
believers and skeptics as illustrated in Fig. 2 which shows that the microstate pairs A↔B, 
A↔C and B↔C constitute a quadruplet sequence A to C to B to A in believers and an A to B 
to C to A quadruplet sequence in skeptics. Figure 2 also displays the P-values of the separate 
tests of these directional predominances against the null hypothesis of no directional 
predominance between microstate pairs
Across all participants, the three involved directional predominances correlated 
significantly with paranormal belief: For (A to C)–(C to A) r = 0.43, P = 0.021; for (C to B)-
(B to C) r = 0.56, P = 0.001; and for (B to A)–(A to B) r = 0.45, P = 0.015. 
--- Fig. 2 about here ---
--- Table 2 about here ---
Based on these findings of directional predominance in believers and skeptics, all possible 
quadruplets of the microstates sequences A  C  B  A, C  B  A  C and B  A 
C  B (‘left-rotating’) as well as A  B  C  A, B  CA  B and C  A B  C 
(‘right-rotating’) were counted and expressed as percentages of the total number of 
microstates for each participant. The difference of left-rotating minus right-rotating 
quadruplet percentages was computed for each participant. Comparing these differences 
between groups, believers tended to have a higher preference for left quadruplets than 
skeptics (0.67 ± 1.65% vs. -0.29 ± 0.66%; t = 1.97; df = 27; P = 0.059).
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Discussion
The microstate features reflected the personality difference between believers and 
skeptics. Rapid spontaneous reorganization of large-scale neuronal activity, characterized by 
the EEG microstates, represents the brain’s ability to flexibly react to and integrate various 
incoming information. Hence, deviations in the tuning of the spontaneous microstate 
parameters reflect differences in the cognitive style and thus different dispositions to interpret 
the environment, here expressed as belief in and skepticism of paranormal phenomena.
Microstates of class B in believers compared to skeptics showed increased occurrence; 
because there was no difference in duration, an increase in time coverage resulted. Class B 
microstates have been associated with concrete/ visual imagery-type thoughts as opposed to 
microstate class A which has been associated with abstract thoughts (Lehmann et al. 1998, 
2010). Microstate class B has been correlated with negative BOLD signals in posterior 
occipital regions that are dedicated to visual processing (Britz et al. 2010). The same network 
had previously been identified as RSN 3 by Mantini et al. (2007). Thus, the present result 
suggests that believers tend to spend more time with thoughts of the concrete/visual imagery-
type than skeptics.
On the other hand, microstates of class C in believers compared to skeptics showed a 
tendency to decreased occurrence that, in the absence of a difference in duration, resulted in 
decreased time coverage. Microstate class C has been correlated with positive BOLD signals 
in the ACC, bilateral inferior frontal gyri as well as right insula (Britz et al. 2010) comparable 
to the regions of RSN 6 in Mantini et al. (2007). Class C microstates have been suggested to 
involve processing with reduced attention (Brandeis and Lehmann 1989; Koenig et al. 1999); 
this would suggest that believers tend to spend less time in reduced attention than skeptics. 
We note that microstate classes A and B because of their higher GFP peaks frequencies imply 
higher neural activation levels, i.e. higher global excitation than the microstates of classes C 
and D.
Since a given microstate is co-determined by its preceding microstate, one could 
speculate on inferences of the successive steps of cognitive processes based on the microstate 
syntax: In believers, a concrete thought (class B) is followed by abstraction (class A) which in 
turn leads to decreased attention with decreased excitation (class C), while in skeptics, an 
abstract thought (class A) is followed by concretization (class B) which in turn leads to 
decreased attention with decreased excitation (class C). Vice versa, decreased attention is 
followed by a concrete thought in believers and by an abstract thought in skeptics. Certainly, 
more research is needed to corroborate such speculative interpretations in view of the very 
limited knowledge on functional significance of the microstate classes.
Microstate classes A, B, and C differed significantly in topography between believers and 
skeptics. It is obvious that humans have more than four different types of thought, even 
though the number of different thought types most likely is quite limited. Our analysis forced 
all maps into the four standard microstate classes that were repeatedly reported as reviewed in 
the introduction. Hence, a given microstate class in a given individual will consist of different 
topographies. In general, a given microstate class must be assumed to encompass a relatively 
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large repertoire of related processing strategies. Differences between groups in the 
composition of the repertoire of processing strategies of a given class will be detectable as 
topographic differences of microstates.
Even though the topography of a microstate class might differ to some extent between 
participant groups, this would not imply a fundamental difference because the class 
designation was imposed by the class template that optimized the assignment ensuring 
maximal difference to the other classes (as a consequence, the topographies of the four 
microstate classes differed significantly from each other). But, for the same reason, the 
microstate classes must imply fundamental differences in brain activity. Most importantly, the 
topographies assigned to their microstate classes behave in the same fashion, irrespective to 
individual differences, i.e., they are anticorrelated to all the other classes. As it has been well 
established in schizophrenia studies, the microstate parameters reveal reliable and consistent 
group differences across a large diversity of participants, in spite of the variety of contributing 
map topographies.
Microstate classes A and B displayed a significantly stronger right-hemispheric activity in 
believers compared to skeptics. This reflects the finding in the earlier wave frequency-
oriented analysis of the same data by Pizzagalli et al. (2000) where believers compared to 
skeptics showed a right-shifted gravity center of brain activity in the beta-2 frequency band, 
confirming a hypothesized right-hemispheric functional predominance in people with 
tendencies to paranormal ideation (Brugger and Graves 1997; Leonhard and Brugger 1998; 
Pizzagalli et al. 2001).
We note that the analysis approaches of the present study and that of Pizzagalli et al. 
(2000) are completely different: The present analysis classifies each momentary time frame 
according to its topography and thereby distinguishes time epochs with different 
topographies. This detects changes of the functional state of the brain at a very high time 
resolution. Frequency decomposition is not part of the approach. On the other hand, the 
Fourier transformation and decomposition into ‘wave’ frequencies (or frequency bands) 
convolutes the data over time and therefore yields results that refer to the entire analyzed data. 
Because the two approaches examine the data from completely different viewpoints, their 
results will detect different aspects and thereby complement each other. 
Relating paranormal belief as one of the features of schizotypal personalities to increased 
risk for schizophrenia (Eckblad and Chapman 1983; Meehl 1962) leads to the question 
whether the present results support a relation between brain mechanisms of paranormal belief 
and those of schizophrenia. Electrophysiological relations between schizotypy and 
paranormal belief have been discussed (Pizzagalli et al. 2000). However, the principal 
deviations of microstate parameters in schizophrenia (Irisawa et al. 2007; Kikuchi et al. 2007; 
Koenig et al. 1999; Lehmann et al. 2005; Strelets et al. 2003), i.e., decreased duration of 
classes B and D and increased occurrence of A and C were not observed in the believers. In 
fact, believers showed an opposing result, decreased occurrence of C. Increased occurrence of 
B as seen in believers had been reported only in one schizophrenia study (Kikuchi et al. 
2007). The scale-free dynamics of microstates (see introduction) have been shown to depend 
on microstate duration (Van De Ville et al. 2010), the prominently deviant parameter in 
schizophrenia. Since our groups did not differ in microstate durations, this would suggest that 
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the results represent short-term dependencies that may not be visible in fMRI, i.e., after strong 
temporal low-pass filtering. Microstate syntax fundamentally differed between the present 
study and findings in schizophrenia: While believers and skeptics showed inverted sequencing 
between microstate classes A, B, and C, schizophrenics and normals showed inverted 
sequencing between microstate classes A, C, and D (Lehmann et al. 2005). In sum, the present 
EEG microstate analysis showed very little support for electrophysiological similarities 
between paranormal beliefs and schizophrenia; this would agree with the notion that 
paranormal belief may exist without tendencies to psychosis (Goulding 2004; McCreery and 
Claridge 2002).
Acknowledgement
We thank Dr. Diego Pizzagalli for his help with the data collection.
11 of 17
References
Brandeis D, Lehmann D (1989) Segments of ERP map series reveal landscape changes with visual 
attention and subjective contours. Electroencephalogr. Clin. Neurophysiol. 73:507–519
Britz J, Landis T, Michel CM (2009) Right parietal brain activity precedes perceptual alternation of 
bistable stimuli. Cereb. Cortex 19:55-65
Britz J, Van De Ville D, Michel CM (2010) BOLD correlates of EEG topography reveal rapid resting-
state network dynamics. Neuroimage 52:1162-1170
Brugger P, Graves RE (1997) Right hemispatial inattention and magical ideation. Eur Arch Psychiatry 
Clin Neurosci 247:55–57
Chatrian G, Lettich E, Nelson P (1988) Modified nomenclature for the "10%" electrode system. J. 
Clin. Neurophysiol. 5:183-186
Eckblad M, Chapman LJ (1983) Magical ideation as an indicatior of schizotypy. J. Consult. Clin. 
Psychol. 51:215-225
Goulding A (2004) Schizotypy models in relation to subjective health and paranormal beliefs and 
experiences. Personality and Individual Differences 37:157-167
Irisawa S, Isotani T, Yagyu T, Morita S, Nishida K, Yamada K, Yoshimura M, Okugawa G, Nobuhara 
K, Kinoshita T (2006) Increased omega complexity and decreased microstate duration in 
nonmedicated schizophrenic patients. Neuropsychobiology 54:134-139
Kikuchi M, Koenig T, Wada Y, Higashima M, Koshino Y, Strik W, Dierks T (2007) Native EEG and 
treatment effects in neuroleptic-naïve schizophrenic patients: time and frequency domain 
approaches. Schizophr. Res. 97:163-172
Kinoshita T, Kuginuki T, Yagyu T, Saito N, Hirota T, Saito M (1998) Spatial EEG field configuration 
in schizophrenics. Psychiatry Res. Neuroimaging 83:58
Koenig T, Lehmann D, Merlo MCG, Kochi K, Hell D, Koukkou M (1999) A deviant EEG brain 
microstate in acute, neuroleptic-naive schizophrenics at rest. Eur. Arch. Psychiatry Clin. 
Neurosci. 249:205-211
Koenig T, Prichep L, Lehmann D, Sosa PV, Braeker E, Kleinlogel H, Isenhart R, John ER (2002) 
Millisecond by millisecond, year by year: normative EEG microstates and developmental 
stages. Neuroimage 16:41-48
Lehmann D, Skrandies W (1980) Reference-free identifiation of components of che checkerboard-
evoked multichannel potential fields. Electroencephalogr. Clin. Neurophysiol. 48:609-621
Lehmann D, Ozaki H, Pal I (1987) EEG alpha map series: brain micro-states by space-oriented 
adaptive segmentation. Electroencephalogr. Clin. Neurophysiol. 67:271-288
Lehmann D, Strik WK, Henggeler B, Koenig T, Koukkou M (1998) Brain electric microstates and 
momentary conscious mind states as building blocks of spontaneous thinking: I. Visual 
imagery and abstract thoughts. Int. J. Psychophysiol. 29:1-11
Lehmann D, Faber PL, Galderisi S, Herrmann WM, Kinoshita T, Koukkou M, Mucci A, Pascual-
Marqui RD, Saito N, Wackermann J, Winterer G, Koenig T (2005) EEG microstate duration 
and syntax in acute, medication-naRve, first-episode schizophrenia: a multi-center study. 
Psychiatry Res. Neuroimaging 138:141-156
Lehmann D, Pascual-Marqui RD, Strik WK, Koenig T (2010) Core networks for visual-concrete and 
abstract thought content: a brain electric microstate analysis. Neuroimage 49:1073-1079
Leonhard D, Brugger P (1998) Creative, paranormal, and delusional thought: a consequence of right 
hemisphere semantic activation? Neuropsychiatry Neuropsychol Behav Neurol 11:177–183
12 of 17
Mantini D, Perrucci MG, Del Gratta C, Romani GL, Corbetta M (2007) Electrophysiological 
signatures of resting state networks in the human brain. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 
104:13170-13175
McCreery C, Clardige G (2002) Healthy schizotypy: the case of out-of-the-body experiences. 
Personality and Individual Differences 32:141-154
Meehl PE (1962) Schizotaxia, schizotypy, schizophrenia. Am. Psychol. 17:827-838
Mischo J, Boller E, Braun G (1993) Fragebogenuntersuchung zur Erfassung von okkulten 
Glaubenshaltungen und Merkmalen schizotypischer Verarbeitung. Institut für Grenzgebiete 
der Psychologie und Psychohygiene, Freiburg i. Br., Germany
Mohr C, Michel CM, Lantz G, Ortigue S, Viaud-Delmon I, Landis T (2005) Brain State-dependent 
Functional Hemispheric Specialization in Men but not in Women. Cereb. Cortex 15:1451-
1458
Müller TJ, Koenig T, Wackermann J, Kalus P, Fallgatter A, Strik W, Lehmann D (2005) Subsecond 
changes of global brain state in illusory multistable motion perception. J. Neural Transm. 
112:1435-1463
Musso F, Brinkmeyer J, Mobascher A, Warbrick T, Winterer G (2010) Spontaneous brain activity and 
EEG microstates. A novel EEG/fMRI analysis approach to explore resting-state networks. 
NeuroImage. 52:1149-1161
Pascual-Marqui RD, Michel CM, Lehmann D (1995) Segmentation of Brain Electrical Activity into 
Microstates: Model Estimation and Validation. Transactions on Biomedical Engineering 
42:658-665
Pizzagalli D, Lehmann D, Gianotti L, Koenig T, Tanaka H, Wackermann J, Brugger P  (2000) Brain 
electric correlates of strong belief in paranormal phenomena: intracerebral EEG source and 
regional Omega complexity analyses. Psychiatry Res. Neuroimaging 100:139-154
Strelets V, Faber PL, Golikova J, Novototsky-Vlasov V, Koenig T, Gianotti LRR, Gruzelier JH, 
Lehmann D (2003) Chronic schizophrenics with positive symptomatology have shortened 
EEG microstate durations. Clin Neurophysiol 114:2043–2051
Strik WK, Fallgatter AJ, Brandeis D, Pascual-Marqui RD (1998) Three dimensional tomography of 
event-related potentials during response inhibition: evidence for phasic frontal lobe activation. 
Electroencephalogr Clin Neurophysiol 108:406–413
Van De Ville D, Britz J, Michel CM (2010) EEG microstate sequences in healthy humans at rest reveal 
scale-free dynamics. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 107:18179-18184
Wackermann J, Lehmann D, Michel CM, Strik WK (1993) Adaptive segmentation of spontaneous 
EEG map series into spatially defined microstates. Int. J. Psychophysiol. 14:269-283
13 of 17
Figure Legends
Fig. 1 The four microstate classes A–D in believers (Bel) and skeptics (Ske). a Mean potential 
distribution maps of the microstate classes of believers and skeptics, normalized for equal 
field power. Red and blue are the arbitrarily chosen color labels for areas of opposite polarity; 
isopotential lines in steps of 1.0 units. b Spatial distribution of standard errors of the mean; 
isopotential lines in steps of 0.1 units. c Topography of the t-values of channel-wise t-tests of 
differences between the potential distributions in believers and skeptics; red: believers higher 
potential than skeptics, blue: skeptics higher potential than believers. Iso-t-value lines in steps 
of t = 1. Head seen from above (nose up, left ear left)
Fig.2 Directional predominances of microstate concatenations for the 16 believers and 13 
skeptics. Letters indicate the microstate classes A through D; lines indicate the six possible 
transitions between pairs of microstate classes. Upper graph Directional predominances 
differed significantly between believers and skeptics for the concatenation of microstates of 
classes A, B and C; P-values < 0.05 are listed. Lower graphs Directional predominances for 
the concatenation of the microstate classes A, B and C separately illustrated for believers and 
skeptics show inverted sequencing. The t-test results of the directional predominances 
between microstate classes versus no directional predominances are listed
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Tables
Table 1 Microstate parameters
microstate class
A B C D
mean S. D. mean S. D. mean S. D. mean S. D.
Durat
ion 
(ms)
believ
ers
74.86 11.29 86.01 16.15 89.21 16.35 82.20 15.25
skepti
cs
77.28 15.18 78.70 25.28 93.35 14.06 81.72 22.18
t (df=27) -0.48 0.91 -0.70 0.07
P 0.64 0.37 0.49 0.95
occur
rences 
/ s
believ
ers
2.61 0.71 3.27 0.61 3.39  0.53 3.26 0.49
skepti
cs
3.00 0.79 2.64 1.00 3.81  0.77 3.12 0.80
t (df=27) –1.40 2.11 –1.74 0.58
P 0.17 0.044 0.093 0.57
cover
age
( % 
time)
believ
ers
19.03 5.80 26.28 4.49 28.99  5.61 25.68 5.21 
skepti
cs
21.65 6.21 20.08 9.05 33.75  7.66 24.53 8.02
t (df=27) –1.17 2.41 –1.93 0.47
P 0.25 0.023 0.064 0.65
Mean and standard deviation (S.D.) for 16 believers and 13 skeptics as well as tests for group 
differences (unpaired t-tests, two-tailed P). P < 0.05 in bold.
Table 2 Directional predominances in the microstate syntax
beli
ever
s
skep
tics
believers - skeptics
mean
S. D
.
t
(df=15)
P(H0
)
mean
S. D
.
t
(df=12)
P(H0
)
mean 
diff.
t
(df=27)
P
A↔B –0.51 1.41 –1.45 0.168 0.48 0.91 1.91 0.081 -0.99 –2.19 0.037
A↔C 0.64 1.25 2.06 0.057 –0.41 0.82 –1.78 0.101 1.05 2.60 0.015
D 0.02 0.96 0.09 0.930 0.01 1.20 0.04 0.973 0.01 0.03 0.980
B↔C –0.58 1.24 –1.87 0.082 0.91 1.13 2.91 0.013 -1.49 -3.34 0.002
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B↔D -0.03 1.69 –0.08 0.941 -0.21 1.37 –0.56 0.587 0.18 0.31 0.759
C↔D 0.01 1.10 –0.05 0.960 0.46 1.49 1.10 0.291 -0.44 -0.92 0.366
Mean and standard deviation (S.D.) of the percentages of directional predominances 
[X↔Y=(X→Y)-(Y→X)] for 16 believers and 13 skeptics. Test results for H0: X↔Y = 0 are 
shown for each group (paired t-tests, two-tailed) as well as tests for group differences 
(unpaired t-tests, two-tailed). P < 0.05 in bold.
